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ESSAY
POPULAR ORIGINALISM? THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Rebecca E. Zietlow*
The U.S. Constitution is currently the subject of a heated political
debate. Tea Party activists have invoked the Constitution as the foundation
of their conservative political philosophy. These activists are engaged in
“popular originalism,” using popular constitutionalism—constitutional
interpretation outside of the courts—to invoke originalism as interpretive
method. The Tea Party movement thus provides an excellent heuristic to
explore the relationship between originalism and popular
constitutionalism, two prominent trends in constitutional theory. Both
originalists and popular constitutionalists study legal history to illuminate
constitutional meaning, but the two schools of thought draw diverging
lessons from that history. Originalists look to history to determine the fixed
“original” meaning of the Constitution, which they hold to be binding on
contemporary interpreters, regardless of subsequent historical or political
developments. Popular constitutionalists study the way in which
constitutional interpretation has been influenced by historical
developments and explore the use of constitutional theory to bolster
constitutional arguments. This Essay explores the convergence and
divergence between originalism and popular constitutionalism and
questions whether popular originalism is feasible, given originalists’
fidelity to the original text of the Constitution. This Essay concludes by
asking what popular originalism can teach us about constitutional
interpretation and democracy. While modern originalism began as a
critique of judicial overreaching into the political process, it has evolved
into a justification for courts to overturn democratic measures.
Paradoxically, then, the popular originalism of the Tea Party may achieve
its only success not through the democratic process, but in the federal
courts.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 484
I.

THE TEA PARTY, ORIGINALISM, AND POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM ............................................................... 488
A. The Tea Party Movement ................................................. 488
B. Originalism ...................................................................... 491

* Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
Copyright Rebecca E. Zietlow. I presented an earlier version of this Essay at the 2010 Law and
Society Association. I would like to thank the other panel participants, Randy Barnett, Mark Graber,
Lawrence Solum, and Lee Strang, for their helpful comments and encouragement. I would also like
to thank Jack Balkin, Alfred Brophy, Todd Pettys, and Lee Strang for comments on earlier drafts.
483

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5

484

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

C. Popular Constitutionalism ............................................... 494
II.

POPULAR ORIGINALISM—AN OXYMORON? ............................. 499
A. History, Fidelity, and Meaning ........................................ 500
B. Politics and Law in Constitutional Interpretation ........... 501

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND DEMOCRACY ............ 505

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 510
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution is currently the subject of a heated political
debate. Most notably, Tea Party activists have invoked the Constitution as
the foundation of their conservative philosophy of limited government.1
They advocate a return to the constitutional interpretation of the past,
calling for limits on congressional power that they believe to be consistent
with the original meaning of the Constitution.2 The Tea Party movement is
therefore engaged in “popular originalism”3—constitutional interpretation
outside of the courts4—to invoke originalism as interpretive method.5
The Tea Party movement highlights the relationship between popular
constitutionalism and originalism, two interpretive methods that have
captivated the attention of constitutional theorists in the past decade. The
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Radical Constitutionalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 28, 2010, at
34.
2. See Randy Barnett, The Tea Party, the Constitution, and the Repeal Amendment, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 281, 282 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/
10/LRColl2011n10Barnett.pdf.
3. Professor Jared Goldstein first coined the term “popular originalism” in Jared A.
Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 288, 298 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/11/LRColl
2011n11Goldstein.pdf [hereinafter Goldstein, Popular Constitutionalism]; see also Jared A.
Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827
(2011) [hereinafter Goldstein, Perils of Popular Originalism].
4. I use the term “popular constitutionalism” here broadly to refer to all constitutional
advocacy outside of the courts by individual advocates, political movements, or elected officials. As
I have explained elsewhere, there is a significant difference between the popular constitutionalism
of “the people themselves,” see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004), and that of democratically elected lawmakers.
See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 73 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1367 (2011). When legislatures engage in popular constitutionalism, the legislative process
provides procedural protections, transparency, and accountability that is lacking from political
movements. Id. Nonetheless, lawmakers exercising popular constitutionalism are almost always
acting in response to political movements.
5. Rosen, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting Utah Senator Mike Lee, who promised during the
campaign that “[a]s your U.S. senator, I will not vote for a single bill that I can’t justify based on
the text and the original understanding of the Constitution, no matter what the court says you can
do”).
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Tea Party movement thus provides a valuable heuristic for considering the
relationship between the two constitutional methods. While at first the
notion of popular originalism may seem paradoxical, the relationship
between originalism and popular constitutionalism is, in fact, both
complex and nuanced.6 Exploring this relationship reveals important
lessons about constitutional theory and the importance of context to
constitutional development. Originalism has evolved from a constitutional
method that championed deference to the political branches to one that
embraces judicial supremacy.7 Thus, the popular originalism of the Tea
Party movement raises the question of whether a popular constitutionalist
can be a faithful originalist. It may not be possible for an originalist to
engage in the political realm and maintain fidelity to the original meaning
of the Constitution. Paradoxically, then, the principal contribution of
popular originalism to constitutional interpretation may be to provide a
justification for judicial activism.
Constitutional scholarship in recent years arguably has been polarized
along political lines. Many scholars have embraced originalism, a method
of constitutional interpretation which seeks to discern the meaning of the
Constitution at the time that it was adopted.8 Perhaps because originalism
is resistant to change in constitutional meaning, scholars who advocate
originalism tend to be politically conservative or libertarian.9 On the other
end of the spectrum are scholars who advocate popular constitutionalism.10
6. This relationship has been receiving growing attention from constitutional scholars. See,
e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be
Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 321–22 (2008); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a
Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 547–49 (2006); Lee
J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical
Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1–2), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1658549.
7. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 602, 608
(2004). But see Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1539, 1542 (2005) (book review) (“Courts lack interpretive supremacy—the power to resolve,
once and for all, the Constitution’s meaning.”).
8. Some influential works on originalism include RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); and
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Papers Series,
No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
9. See Strang, supra note 6, at 34–35. One notable exception is Jack Balkin, a prominent
liberal constitutional scholar who advocates originalism. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009) (arguing that “the most
intellectually sound version[]” of originalism is “original meaning originalism,” which aims to set
out the basic structure of government and to make future constitutional construction possible and is
therefore compatible with living constitutionalism).
10. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 4; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS (1999); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006); James G. Pope, Labor’s Constitution of
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Perhaps because many of the successful political movements that have
engaged in popular constitutionalism have been progressive,11 scholars
who study popular constitutionalism tend to be liberal or progressive. The
popular originalism of the conservative Tea Party movement is thus
particularly intriguing because of the counterintuitive nature of its political
agenda from the perspective of constitutional theory.12
Originalists and popular constitutionalists differ not only along political
lines, but also (and more importantly) along jurisprudential lines. Popular
constitutionalism is arguably antithetical to originalism as a method of
constitutional interpretation.13 While originalists believe that the
constitution has a fixed meaning, popular constitutionalism is the purest
example of the “living constitutionalism” originalists decry. However,
these two lines of scholarship have something crucially important in
common: their interest in legal history. Originalists study legal history to
understand the original meaning of the Constitution, and popular
constitutionalists study history to understand the impact of historical and
political events on constitutional development. Both groups of scholars
have reason to be interested in the Tea Party movement. In the Tea Party,
originalists have found an important political ally that has increased the
Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
11. But see Christopher W. Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the Right: Lessons from
the Tea Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523, 550–52 (2011) (detailing examples of conservative
movements invoking the Constitution).
12. Indeed, the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy recently published the
proceedings of an AALS annual meeting panel about the popular constitutionalism of the Tea Party
movement. See Richard Albert, The Constitutional Politics of the Tea Party Movement, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 267, 267–68 (2011), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2011/8/LRColl2011n8Albert.pdf; Barnett, supra note 2, at 282; Goldstein, Popular
Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 289–91; Sanford Levinson, If We Have an Imperfect
Constitution, Should We Settle for Remarkably Timid Reform? Reflections Generated by the
General Phenomenon of “Tea Party Constitutionalism” and Randy Barnett’s Particular Proposal
for a “Repeal Amendment” Designed to Rein in an Overreaching Congress, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 271, 279–80 (2011), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
2011/9/LRColl2011n9Levinson.pdf; Ilya Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular
Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300, 306–08 (2011), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/12/LRColl2011n12Somin.pdf. Other
scholarship on the Tea Party movement and constitutional theory includes Goldstein, Perils of
Popular Originalism, supra note 3; Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party’s Constitution, 88 DENV. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming); Schmidt, supra note 11.
13. See Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss,
Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1103 (2009) (“Popular constitutionalism was, and
remains, closer in spirit to modern ideas of a living constitution, and is therefore ultimately
incompatible with all forms of originalism.”). But see Strang, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining that
popular constitutionalism and originalism are theoretically compatible).
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salience of their method of constitutional interpretation.14 On the other
hand, even if they disagree with the policy goals of the Tea Party
movement, popular constitutionalists should see the movement as an
important example of that phenomenon in action.
Although originalists and popular constitutionalists share an interest in
legal history, they disagree about the import of that history. Originalists
study history to determine what they view as the fixed meaning of
constitutional provisions, which does not change over time. They maintain
that present day interpreters of the Constitution are bound by that original
meaning.15 On the other hand, popular constitutionalists are skeptical of
both the notion that meaning is fixed and the view that original meaning is
binding.16 Popular constitutionalists are interested in how constitutional
development has been affected by historical and political contexts and are
resistant to the idea that the Constitution has definitive meaning devoid of
context.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, originalism and popular
constitutionalism can lead in very different directions when determining
the relationship between democratic participation and constitutional
development. The popular originalism of the Tea Party raises the issue of
whether it is possible to be faithful to the original meaning of the
Constitution while engaging in democratic politics. If not, popular
originalism could paradoxically lead to a reduction of the role of
democracy in constitutional interpretation.
Currently, both politicians and constitutional scholars are engaged in a
debate over the role of the federal government in people’s lives—whether
the government has a duty to provide protection and some form of
economic equality, or whether the government should be restricted by
principles of federalism and limits on congressional power. The current
debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),17 with
the federal government on one side and the Tea Party movement in
opposition, pits fundamental visions of the role of the federal government
and the limits of congressional power against each other. To the extent that
this debate is resolved, the success or failure of the Tea Party’s popular
originalism will likely affect our political and constitutional landscape for
years to come.
Part I of this Essay provides a brief definition of the Tea Party
movement, originalism, and popular constitutionalism. While originalism
and popular constitutionalism simultaneously have gained prominence in
academia, the two groups of scholars rarely interact. This Part suggests that
14. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 283 (describing his work with Tea Party activists).
15. See Solum, supra note 8, at 2.
16. See Pettys, supra note 6, at 320–21.
17. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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there is considerable overlap between the two schools of thought,
particularly their interest in the impact of history on constitutional
development. Conversely, Part II acknowledges the extent to which
originalism and popular constitutionalism diverge. Popular
constitutionalists and originalists differ fundamentally on their
understanding of constitutional fidelity and meaning. This raises the
question of whether popular originalism is indeed feasible. Part III analyzes
the relationship between constitutional interpretation and democracy in
originalism and popular constitutionalism. It tentatively predicts that the
popular originalism of the Tea Party is most likely to succeed not through
the democratic process, but by the mechanism of judicial review.
I. THE TEA PARTY, ORIGINALISM, AND POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Tea Party is a group of people protesting the size and power of the
federal government.18 Tea Party activists call for limits on congressional
power that they believe to be consistent with the Constitution’s original
meaning.19 Tea Party activists thus draw on two current trends in
constitutional theory—originalism and popular constitutionalism. This Part
briefly defines the terms “originalism” and “popular constitutionalism,”
and discusses the relationship between them. Leaders of the Tea Party
movement have championed originalism by adopting an originalist
approach to the Constitution as one of their central principles. Yet, the
current political salience of originalism in the Tea Party movement is a
significant example of popular constitutionalism.
What is notable about the study of originalism and popular
constitutionalism is that scholars who engage in both endeavors rely on
history to understand constitutional meaning and development. This
significant convergence of interpretive focus belies the political and
methodological divide between the two camps of scholars in determining
constitutional meaning. This Essay attempts to bridge that divide by
considering the overlap between originalism and popular constitutionalism.
It begins by defining the terms in order to enhance understanding.
A. The Tea Party Movement
The Tea Party movement began in spring 2009, as groups of people
met to protest government measures intended to address the economic
crisis, including the stimulus and bank bailout measures that Congress had
recently enacted.20 The first Tea Party demonstrations were held on April
18. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 282.
19. It is debatable whether the Tea Party’s interpretation of the Constitution is correct.
Compare Goldstein, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 290 (referring to the Tea Party’s
constitutional theory as “constitutional mythology”), with Somin, supra note 12, at 306 (defending
the level of education, knowledge, and sophistication of participants in the Tea Party movement).
20. See Kathleen Lucadamo, Stimulus Critics Stage “Tea Party,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1,
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15 of that year, protesting, among other things, the size of the federal
government.21 The movement gained momentum that summer, as Tea
Party activists attended town hall meetings of congressional representatives
to protest the healthcare reform bill, then pending before Congress.22 Tea
Partiers continued to stage protests throughout congressional debates over
the ACA. After Congress adopted the healthcare reform measure, Tea
Party activists adopted a two-pronged protest approach. They challenged
the constitutionality of the ACA in the federal courts, but also turned to
electoral politics to support candidates who opposed the ACA, federal
taxes, and federal spending in general.23 Tea Party-supported candidates
scored significant victories in the 2010 congressional elections.24 Members
of Congress elected with the support of the Tea Partiers adamantly opposed
federal spending measures and taxes, and they played a leading role in the
debt ceiling crisis in summer 2011.25
The degree to which the Tea Party movement is a grassroots movement
is debatable. Tea Party organizers have received extensive financial
support from prominent conservative think-tanks and financiers.26
Moreover, declarations made by Tea Party supporters at rallies and town
hall meetings, such as “Keep your government hands off my Medicare,”27
reflect confusion among some Tea Party activists about the role that
government actually plays in people’s lives.28 Nonetheless, it is
2009, at 13, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/02/28/2009-0228_stimulus_critics_stage_tea_party.html; see also Somin, supra note 12, at 303 (citing Lucadamo,
supra).
21. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 281–82.
22. Id. at 284.
23. See id. at 284–85 (discussing Tea Party support for a repeal amendment and the
endorsements the amendment subsequently received from various legislative leaders).
24. Albert, supra note 12, at 267–68 (detailing victories of Tea Party candidates in
congressional elections).
25. See Michael D. Shear, Freshman Republicans Face Defining Debt Vote, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG: CAUCUS (July 28, 2011, 9:43 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/
freshman-republicans-face-defining-debt-vote/?scp=13&sq=tea%20party%20debt&st=cse.
26. E.g., George Monbiot, The Tea Party Movement: Deluded and Inspired by Billionaires,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2010, 15:15 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/
oct/25/tea-party-koch-brothers. The extent to which the success of the Tea Party movement reflects
anxiety about racial change, ignited by the election of the first black president in the history of the
United States, is also debatable. See Yepoka Yeebo, Surprising Way Race Colors Attitudes to
Health Care Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2011/03/08/race-health-care-reform_n_832783.html. But see Barnett, supra note 2, at 281
(dismissing charges that Tea Partiers are motivated by racial prejudice).
27. Bob Cesca, Keep Your Goddamn Government Hands off My Medicare!, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 5, 2009, 6:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-cesca/get-your-goddamngovernme_b_252326.html.
28. See Chris Good, The Tea Party Movement: Who's in Charge?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2009,
6:07 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/04/the-tea-party-movement-whos-incharge/13041 (detailing the Tea Party’s ties to larger conservative organizations); Monbiot, supra
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indisputable that the Tea Party movement reflects a certain amount of
popular distrust of government and anxiety about change, especially
regarding increases in the size and power of the federal government.
The constitutional vision of the Tea Party focuses on limiting the
power of the federal government by reducing spending and opposing taxes
that support federal programs.29 The Tea Party’s primary target has been
the ACA, which, it argues, unduly expands the power of the federal
government and infringes on individual liberty.30 Some Tea Partiers have
called for changes to the existing Constitution.31 This group supports a
constitutional amendment that would authorize the repeal of congressional
acts if two-thirds of all state legislatures voted for the change.32 Tea Party
activists have also proposed repealing existing constitutional amendments,
including the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes the federal income
tax,33 and the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for the direct
election of U.S. senators,34 as well as either repealing or amending the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees
birthright citizenship for people born in the United States.35
note 26 (calling the Tea Party movement “one of the biggest exercises in false consciousness the
world has seen—and the biggest Astroturf operation in history”). But see Barnett, supra note 2, at
281 (arguing that reports questioning the grassroots nature of the Tea Party movement are
“essentially false”). According to an April 2010 poll, 18% of those polled identified themselves as
Tea Party supporters. However, only 4% had attended a Tea Party meeting or donated to the
movement. Kate Zernike, Poll Shows Negative View of Tea Party Is on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/us/politics/05teaparty.html. On
Election Day in November 2010, polls showed that four in ten voters said they were Tea Party
supporters, and of those polled, only 18% characterized their view as “not favorable.” See id. By
August 2011, the number of voters characterizing their view as “not favorable” increased to 40%.
Id.
29. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 282 (“[T]he Tea Party movement is about two big subjects:
first, the undeniable recent surge in national government spending and debt, and second, what Tea
Partiers perceive as a federal government that has greatly exceeded its constitutional powers.”).
30. See id. at 282, 284.
31. Elizabeth P. Foley, Sovereignty, Rebalanced: The Tea Party & Constitutional
Amendments, 78 TENN. L. REV. 751, 754 (2011).
32. Bill Bartel, In Tea Party Speech, McDonnell Backs “Repeal Amendment,” VIRGINIANPILOT (Oct. 9, 2010), http://hamptonroads.com/2010/10/tea-party-speech-mcdonnell-backs-repealamendment; John Rossomando, Tea-Party Affiliated Group Seeks Constitutional Change, DAILY
CALLER (last updated Oct. 3, 2010, 9:27 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/10/02/tea-partyaffiliated-group-seeks-constitutional-change; see also Barnett, supra note 2, at 283–85 (describing
the efforts of Tea Party activists to enact a repeal amendment).
33. David H. Gans, Strange Brew: The Tea Party’s Predictable, but Misguided, Campaign to
Repeal the Sixteenth Amendment, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (July 23, 2010),
http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/?p=1857.
34. Steven D. Schwinn, The Tea Party and the Seventeenth Amendment, CONST. L. PROF
BLOG (June 2, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/06/the-tea-party-and-theseventeenth-amendment.html.
35. See Shannon44, Lindsey Graham Pledges to End “Birthright Citizenship” with
Constitutional Amendment, CHARLESTONTEAPARTY.ORG (July 29, 2010), http://charlestonteaparty
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Tea Party activists advocate an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution that would narrow the power of the federal government, and
some have even called for a constitutional amendment that would require
judges interpreting the Constitution to apply originalist methods.36 As Tea
Party favorite Sarah Palin explained, instead of “a fundamental
transformation of America,” they want to “go back to what our Founders
and our founding documents meant.”37 They also share a general concern
about the size and power of government infringing upon individual
liberty.38 Members of the Tea Party movement claim that they are
champions of individual liberty in the face of a tyrannical federal
government.39 Finally, Tea Partiers embrace the view that individual
Americans have a personal responsibility to study and understand the
Constitution.40 They often criticize courts and reject the notion that only
lawyers can properly interpret the Constitution.41 This dispute over the role
of the federal government and its relationship to individual rights could
influence lawmakers and judges’ constitutional interpretation in coming
years.
B. Originalism
In the past thirty years, originalism has emerged as one of the principal
theories of constitutional interpretation.42 The Supreme Court routinely
surveys original sources when interpreting the Constitution.43 Virtually all
constitutional scholars agree that the original meaning of the Constitution,
to the extent that it can be discerned, is relevant when the Constitution is
applied to contemporary circumstances. What differentiates originalists
.org/?p=6650.
36. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 283.
37. Ellen, Sarah Palin Lectures Fox News Viewers: Our Constitution Creates Law Based on
the God of the Bible and the Ten Commandments, NEWS HOUNDS (May 7, 2010),
http://www.newshounds.us/2010/05/07/sarah_palin_lectures_fox_news_viewers_our_constitutio
n_creates_law_based_on_the_god_of_the_bible_and_the_ten_commandments.php (quoting Sarah
Palin) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Goldstein, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3,
at 292.
38. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 282; Foley, supra note 31, at 754.
39. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 31, at 752. Their opponents argue that the Tea Party is a threat
to individual rights because of their extremist rhetoric and because they dismiss their opponents as
illegitimate and un-American. See Goldstein, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 298.
40. See Schmidt, supra note 11, at 534.
41. Id. Professor Christopher W. Schmidt argues that the Tea Partiers’ antagonism to courts is
based on their general view that courts are not on their side. See id. at n.53. However, as the
litigation over the ACA illustrates, the conservative federal courts are actually quite receptive to the
originalist arguments of the Tea Party movement. See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
42. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 91; Solum, supra note 8, at 1–2.
43. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–07 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
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from popular constitutionalists is the originalist view that the meaning of
the Constitution is limited to its meaning at the time it was adopted.
Originalists argue that subsequent events, including political movements
and other historical developments, are irrelevant to the Constitution’s
meaning today.44
Early modern originalists looked to the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution to determine the meaning of the Constitution.45 They believed
that this was the only context that mattered, and this context occurred only
at the time the Constitution and its amendments were adopted. The main
critique of this early modern originalism or “original intent originalism” is
that it is difficult to determine the intent of even one individual and even
more so the intent of a group of individuals.46 It is not clear whose intent
should matter—that of those who wrote the Constitution or that of those
who voted to ratify it.47 Moreover, the “proposal” of the Constitutional
Convention arguably did not acquire meaning until the ratifying
conventions or until it gained approval from the people themselves.48 The
problem of “collective intent” is thus a major obstacle to original intent
originalism.
Responding to these concerns and others,49 a new strand of originalism
has developed that focuses not on the intent of the Framers, but on the
original meaning of the provisions of the Constitution at the time that they
were adopted.50 This branch of originalism, known as “original public
meaning originalism,” looks to extraneous evidence, such as dictionaries
and newspapers, to determine the generally accepted meaning of the words
used in constitutional text at the time of adoption.51
In all forms of originalism, constitutional meaning is resistant to
44. Cf. Strang, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that court precedents are more likely to be
“nonoriginalist” when they are the “product of popular social movements”).
45. Solum, supra note 8, at 14 (describing and discussing possible rationales behind “original
intentions originalism”). I refer to the originalist movement that began in the 1970s as the “modern”
movement because originalism has been recognized as an interpretive method as early as the
framing of the U.S. Constitution. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 751, 788 (2009).
46. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 214–15 (1980).
47. See Solum, supra note 8, at 40.
48. See id.
49. See Whittington, supra note 7, at 605–06.
50. Prominent “original public meaning” originalists include Randy Barnett, Keith
Whittington, and Lawrence Solum. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 8, at 92; WHITTINGTON, supra
note 8, at 35; Solum, supra note 8, at 2.
51. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 92 (explaining the objective nature of “original meaning”
originalism); Solum, supra note 8, at 4 (“[M]eaning is fixed by the general pattern of usage at the
time of constitutional utterance.”).
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change.52 Some originalists argue that because the Constitution is a written
text articulating the foundational principles of our government, neither
judges nor political actors can change the meaning of the Constitution
short of using the Article V amendment process.53 Others claim that
because the Constitution owes its legitimacy to the consent of the governed
during the ratification process, any changes to the Constitution are
illegitimate unless they undergo the same ratification process.54 All
originalists, however, agree that any law or judicial opinion that deviates
from the original meaning of the Constitution is illegitimate because it is
inconsistent with the meaning of the document.55 Thus, originalism is said
to have the value of providing certainty and stability to constitutional
interpretation.56 Of course, such stability depends on interpreters’
adherence to original meaning instead of policy or political
considerations.57
Originalists differ on the specifics of their interpretive method, and a
full discussion of originalism is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Nonetheless, two aspects of originalism which unite the various camps of
originalist scholars are notable for the purposes of this discussion. The first
is what Professor Lawrence B. Solum calls the “fixation thesis.”58 This
describes the originalist belief that each provision of the Constitution has a
fixed meaning dating back to the time of its adoption.59 The second theme
that unites originalists is the belief that the original intent or meaning of the
Constitution is binding on those interpreting the provisions.60 Thus,
originalism is conservative in the classic sense—it is a method that
requires looking back in time to determine meaning. In sum, originalists
believe that the context that determines the meaning of the Constitution is
52. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 96 (“[T]he fact the Constitution was put in writing is what
mandates that its meaning must remain the same until it is properly changed—or candidly
rejected . . . .”).
53. See id. at 106 (“Adopting any meaning contrary to the original meaning would be to
contradict or change the meaning of the text and thereby to undermine the value of writtenness
itself . . . . A commitment to textualism, therefore, begets a commitment to original meaning unless
this meaning is altered by a written amendment.”).
54. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 706 (2009); cf. Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an
Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1910 (2008).
55. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 8, at 112–13.
56. Kay, supra note 54, at 714–15; see also BARNETT, supra note 8, at 117.
57. A more fundamental concern about originalism is whether the original intent or original
public meaning is actually discernible. This Essay returns to that concern in the next Part. See infra
Part II.
58. See Solum, supra note 8, at 2.
59. Id.; cf. BARNETT, supra note 8, at 89 (“[O]riginalism is warranted because it is the best
method to preserve or ‘lock in’ a constitution that is initially legitimate because of what it says.”).
60. See Solum, supra note 8, at 5.
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the context at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions, not
the context in which they are applied today.
While adhering to the fixation thesis, some original public meaning
originalists nevertheless acknowledge that parts of the Constitution are
sufficiently vague so that they “may still not provide enough guidance to
identify a single rule of law to apply to a particular case at hand.”61 These
scholars “embrace the distinction between ‘constitutional interpretation’
understood as the enterprise of discerning the semantic content of the
[C]onstitution and ‘constitutional construction,’ which we might
tentatively define as the activity of further specifying constitutional rules
when the original public meaning of the text is vague . . . .”62 The context
at the time of interpretation is relevant to the process of construction
because construction takes place when the Constitution is applied to
particular contextual circumstances.63 Nonetheless, an originalist always
tries to adhere as closely as possible to the original meaning of the
Constitution when interpreting it.64
C. Popular Constitutionalism
Recent years have also been marked by a surge of interest in popular
constitutionalism.65 Broadly viewed, popular constitutionalism is any form
of constitutional interpretation that occurs outside of the courts.66 The
people themselves may engage in popular constitutionalism, as when
political movements invoke the Constitution as a basis for their political
arguments.67 When these political movements influence lawmakers and
judges, they can have a lasting impact on constitutional interpretation.
Scholars study popular constitutionalism to understand the historical
dynamics surrounding constitutional development and to understand the
role that the people themselves have played in that development, both
61. BARNETT, supra note 8, at 121. Other originalists reject the view that any provision is
sufficiently vague to require constitutional construction. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
note 45, at 788 (arguing that the only interpretive rules that should be used are those which the
Framers intended).
62. Solum, supra note 8, at 18–19.
63. See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions,
103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 615, 631 (2009).
64. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 125 (arguing that the text provides “a ‘frame’ that excludes
many potential constructions”).
65. Rebecca E. Zietlow & James G. Pope, The Toledo Auto-Lite Strike of 1934 and the Fight
Against “Wage Slavery,” 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 839, 840 (2007). See generally KRAMER, supra note 4;
ZIETLOW, supra note 10; Pope, supra note 10; Post & Siegel, supra note 10.
66. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959,
959–60 (2004) (contrasting the concept of popular constitutionalism with legal constitutionalism).
67. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 10, at 298–300 (focusing on the history of the Equal Rights
Amendment and the Nineteenth Amendment to demonstrate that social movements play a
significant role in shaping constitutional interpretation); Zietlow & Pope, supra note 65, at 849
(focusing on the role of popular constitutionalism in the 1934 AutoLite Strike).
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inside and outside of the courts.68
Popular constitutionalism often occurs in juxtaposition to constitutional
interpretation by the courts. Popular constitutionalists question the role that
judicial review plays in constitutional interpretation.69 Drawing on
Professor Robert M. Cover’s classic Nomos and Narrative,70 some popular
constitutionalists point out that judicial review often has the effect of
inhibiting debate over constitutional meaning.71 Furthermore, popular
constitutionalists differ over the extent to which they oppose judicial
review.72 Few seek to displace judicial review entirely.73 Most popular
constitutionalists simply challenge the hegemony of judicial review in
constitutional interpretation and call on courts to adopt a deferential
attitude towards legislative measures that enforce constitutional values.74
Others point out that popular movements, such as the women’s rights and
gun rights movements, have influenced the Court’s constitutional
interpretation.75 Popular constitutionalism is good for constitutional
development because it involves open debate over fundamental values and
constitutional principles. Thus, popular constitutionalism also strengthens
civic society.
The history of our country is replete with examples of popular
constitutionalism influencing constitutional development in the courts and

68. See generally KRAMER, supra note 4 (detailing the involvement of “the people” in
constitutional development throughout U.S. history); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (examining the influence
of politics on constitutional development); ZIETLOW, supra note 10 (examining congressional
protection of individual rights as a form of popular constitutionalism).
69. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 4, at 229; TUSHNET, supra note 10, at 154.
70. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
71. Kramer, supra note 66, at 975–76. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 10, at 168 (arguing that
the Court’s rejection of claims to economic rights by poor people stifled political efforts to convince
lawmakers to adopt legislation enforcing those rights).
72. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
2047, 2061–64 (2010) (comparing three different populist approaches to judicial review).
73. But see TUSHNET, supra note 10, at 154 (advocating for elimination of judicial review).
74. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 10, at 2023; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1029
(2004).
75. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation
and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 213–14 (2009) (arguing that
increased public acceptance of homosexuals influenced the Court to extend the constitutional right
to privacy to gay couples in sexuality cases); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
1323, 1323–24 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture] (describing the influence of the
feminist movement on the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause); Reva B. Siegel,
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192
(2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive] (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the Second
Amendment has been influenced by the twentieth century gun rights movement).
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the political branches.76 One of the most important examples of this is the
antislavery constitutionalist movement in the early nineteenth century.
Before the Civil War, antislavery constitutionalists invoked principles of
freedom and equality already included in the Constitution to challenge the
constitutionality of slavery, and their vision of freedom and equality had a
profound impact on the Reconstruction Congress.77 Consequently,
Reconstruction ideology also influenced twentieth century activists who
engaged in popular constitutionalism. Drawing on the Free Labor strand of
abolitionism, labor activists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries argued that workers had a constitutional right to organize into
unions based on the First and Thirteenth Amendments.78 Their
understanding of these constitutional provisions formed the core of the
ideology behind a social movement that was eventually successful in
urging Congress to adopt legislation establishing this right.79 Similarly,
civil rights advocates in the mid-twentieth century argued that they had a
constitutional right to equal protection and equal citizenship.80 This strong
constitutional and moral vision, which also drew on the Reconstruction
tradition, was crucial to the success of that movement.81
Notwithstanding the fact that scholars who advocate popular
constitutionalism tend to be liberal or progressive, our country also has a
significant history of conservative popular constitutionalism.82 During the
Antebellum Era, John Calhoun and his followers presented an alternative
vision of the Constitution in which states had the authority to trump federal
antislavery laws.83 Following in Calhoun’s footsteps, in the years following
the Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, southern
segregationists engaged in “massive resistance” to the Court and advocated
76. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (discussing
popular constitutionalism and its influence on the courts); ZIETLOW, supra note 10 (discussing the
influence of popular constitutionalism on the political branches); Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
supra note 75.
77. Antislavery constitutionalists in the Reconstruction Congress sought to constitutionalize
their vision of freedom and the fundamental rights of free people in the Reconstruction
Amendments and civil rights statutes enforcing those amendments. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The
Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); see also
ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 75–76 (1995). See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848 (1977).
78. Pope, supra note 10, at 942; see also Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 499–502 (1989).
79. ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 63–96; Zietlow & Pope, supra note 65, at 839–41.
80. ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 99–104.
81. Id. at 97–99.
82. See Schmidt, supra note 11, at 522.
83. See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY
IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1816–1836, at 166–67 (1965). I would like to thank Al Brophy for pointing this
out to me.
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the nullification of federal law.84 The Tea Party movement, the most salient
example of popular constitutionalism today, advocates a similarly
restrictive reading of congressional power and deemphasizes the
Reconstruction Era expansion of that power.85 Thus, the Tea Partiers are
following in the footsteps of conservative popular constitutionalists before
them.
As the Tea Party rallies further illustrate, public debates over
constitutional values are often disruptive and challenging. However,
because these debates are conducted openly and transparently, the results
tend to be more widely accepted than constitutional change effected by
courts alone.86 Of course, the Supreme Court often plays an important role
in ratifying this change.87 For example, the New Deal Era was
characterized by a debate in both the political branches and the courts over
whether the government had a duty to provide a safety net for the people,
and whether the freedom of contract or the freedom to organize into unions
was a more important constitutional value.88 Congress established a federal
commitment to the economic and social welfare of the people of the United
States, and the Court upheld legislation fostering that commitment.89 The
New Deal was followed by a forty-year period of consensus
acknowledging that the federal government had a duty to provide a safety
net and further the economic security of the people.90
Similarly, the 1960s saw a national debate inside and outside the courts
over whether constitutional protections for equality included freedom from
not only racial segregation but also discrimination based on other
immutable characteristics. The debate was resolved in favor of a broad
view of equality rights, and a widespread consensus remains in this country
that race discrimination and discrimination based on other immutable
characteristics is immoral and should be illegal.91 In both eras, popular
84. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
330–34 (2004).
85. See Rosen, supra note 1, at 34.
86. See Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 75, at 1329 (“Typically, it is only through
sustained conflict that alternative understandings are honed into a form that officials can enforce
and the public will recognize as the Constitution.”).
87. Balkin, supra note 9, at 562.
88. ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 76–77.
89. See ACKERMAN, supra note 76, at 262.
90. Cf. ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 96. Notably, President Lyndon B. Johnson believed that
convincing Congress to enact War on Poverty legislation would be easier than convincing Congress
to enact civil rights legislation. Arguably, this consensus unraveled during the Republican
presidency of Ronald Reagan; its downfall was illustrated most dramatically by Congress’
dismantling of the New Deal program Aid to Families with Dependent Children by the Personal
Responsibility Act of 1996 during the Democratic presidency of Bill Clinton. See id. at 138.
91. By making this observation, I do not intend to state that race discrimination no longer
exists here. There is ample evidence that discrimination based on race and other immutable
characteristics still plagues our country. However, while there is disagreement over the extent to
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
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constitutionalism contributed to the public acceptance of constitutional
values which have expanded the rights of individuals in our nation.
Likewise, resolving the current debate over the size and role of the federal
government, in which the Tea Party is playing a major role, could well
impact our government structure for years to come.
Popular constitutionalists argue that it is normatively desirable for
people other than judges to engage in constitutional interpretation.92 They
claim that the involvement of popular movements and elected officials in
constitutional development is not only important historically, but that it
also has a positive impact on civic society.93 When people engage in
popular constitutionalism, they invoke the essential principles of our
constitutional government and strengthen those principles. Political
movements, including the Tea Party movement, cannot change
constitutional meaning simply through advocacy. Popular constitutionalism
influences constitutional meaning when government officials, including
courts and the political branches, adopt the interpretation advocated by
those engaging in popular constitutionalism.
There are strong normative arguments in favor of popular
constitutionalism. Faith in the Constitution is central to our nation’s
political identity.94 Popular constitutionalism is healthy for civic society
which race discrimination continues to exist, and if so, how best to eradicate it, it is highly unusual
for a public figure to claim that race discrimination is a good thing. Kentucky senatorial candidate
Rand Paul recently revealed his opposition to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits race discrimination in employment. Paul clarified that he was not in favor of race
discrimination, see Jesse, Rand Paul Sets the Record Straight, RAND PAUL: U.S. SENATE (May 20,
2010), http://www.randpaul2010.com/2010/05/rand-paul-sets-the-record-straight; he just thought
the federal government should not be able to tell private businesses how to conduct their business.
The critical outcry in response to Paul’s comments only serves to illustrate my point that we have a
societal consensus that race discrimination is wrong. See Wilson Huhn, Rand Paul Opposes Civil
Rights Laws Prohibiting Acts of Racial Discrimination by Private Businesses, AKRON L. CAFÉ (May
20, 2010), http://www.ohioverticals.com/blogs/akron_law_cafe/2010/05/rand-paul-opposes-civilrights-laws-prohibiting-acts-of-racial-discrimination-by-private-businesses. Cf. Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section
Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 37–38 (2003) (discussing the manner in which the Court “deployed
constitutional standards to interpret the statutory requirements” of civil rights legislation but
avoided the question of whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact certain sections
of the statutes pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). One exception to this
consensus is the question of whether gays and lesbians should enjoy the same anti-discrimination
rights, which is still hotly debated. This exception is particularly noteworthy given that Tea Party
supporters tend to have conservative values, and to oppose gay rights initiatives. See
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/13/us/politics/13tea.html (noting that “the inaugural Tea Party
convention, organized by the social networking site Tea Party Nation, featured remarks by fervent
opponents of gay marriage and abortion rights”).
92. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 10, at ix–x; ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 160–68; Siegel,
supra note 10, at 312–13.
93. See Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 75, at 1329.
94. Pettys, supra note 6, at 347.
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because the Constitution is the foundation of our government: “Although
they may disagree sharply about what the Constitution demands,
Americans today are convinced that a commitment to constitutionalism in
general, and to the core values of the U.S. Constitution in particular, are
central to what it means to be a full-fledged member of the American
community.”95 Our civic values are based in the Constitution, and our
views of the Constitution are often based on what we believe our civic
society should be. In a very real sense, one’s view of the Constitution
reflects what one believes to be one’s most fundamental values, such as
freedom, equality, and the need for security. Because people are bound to
differ in their beliefs about what the Constitution means, when people
engage in popular constitutionalism, they engage in a debate over
fundamental values. This debate is both healthy for civic society and
helpful in determining the content of those values.96
II. POPULAR ORIGINALISM—AN OXYMORON?
What is the relationship between popular constitutionalism and
originalism? At first glance, the two do not seem to have much in
common.97 Originalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that
focuses on what the Constitution and its amendments meant at the time
they were adopted.98 Originalists believe that meaning is both fixed and
binding.99 Popular constitutionalism is a process of constitutional
interpretation that occurs outside of the courts. Unlike originalism, popular
constitutionalism allows for the possibility that constitutional meaning
may change over time because it involves “elaborating constitutional
meaning in this political realm.”100 The two concepts have a common
theme—both look to historical context to determine constitutional
meaning. However, popular constitutionalism and originalism diverge in
their application of history to determine meaning, and more fundamentally,
over the question of whether a constitutional provision has a single
discernible meaning.
One issue that unites originalism and popular constitutionalism is the
extent to which both methods are involved in politics. Like popular
constitutionalism, originalism has influenced the political realm. At the
same time that originalism developed as a jurisprudential movement, it
95. Id.
96. See ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 160–68; Balkin, supra note 9, at 566; Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373,
374 (2007).
97. Indeed, other scholars have treated originalism and popular constitutionalism as
diametrically opposed. See generally Pettys, supra note 6 (arguing in favor of popular
constitutionalism by pointing out inadequacies in originalism).
98. Whittington, supra note 7, at 599.
99. E.g., Solum, supra note 8, at 2.
100. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 68, at 1.
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also gained prominence in conservative political circles. Indeed,
originalism has played an important political role as the foundation of a
conservative jurisprudential movement.101 The strength of originalism as a
rallying force for conservative political actors in the past thirty years, most
recently championed by the Tea Party movement, suggests that the overlap
between originalism and popular constitutionalism is quite significant in
practice.102 From this perspective, the popular originalism of the Tea Party
movement is not an oxymoron. However, the challenge for those who
engage in popular originalism is whether it is possible to adhere to the
original meaning of the Constitution despite political pressures to the
contrary. This Part concludes by considering whether, from this
perspective, popular originalism is indeed feasible.
A. History, Fidelity, and Meaning
Arguably, popular constitutionalism should be irrelevant to an
originalist. Popular constitutionalists determine meaning in contemporary
culture, while originalists determine meaning by looking back to the time
of the framing or adoption of the constitutional provision that is being
interpreted. Both originalism and popular constitutionalism rely on legal
history to determine constitutional meaning, but the two diverge in the
means that they use to determine that meaning. To originalists,
constitutional meaning is fixed and binding on subsequent generations. To
popular constitutionalists, constitutional meaning depends on the
circumstances at the time of the constitutional interpretation, interpreting
the Constitution in the context of contemporary political events. However,
the current political salience of originalism illustrates that originalism and
popular constitutionalism can coexist. Still, some basic divergences
remain, rooted in fundamental principles of meaning.
Most fundamentally, there is disagreement between popular
constitutionalists and originalists over whether the Constitution has a
single discernible meaning, regardless of who is interpreting the provision.
Originalists generally agree that there is a single discernible meaning to
most, if not all, constitutional provisions.103 Popular constitutionalists call
into question the very idea of whether it is possible to discern a single
meaning of any textual provision. They believe that the process of
construction entails the creation of meaning during the application of a
provision to the factual context.104 While some originalists agree that
context is relevant to the application of some constitutional provisions,
101. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 548–51.
102. See id. at 549.
103. Compare Barnett, supra note 63, at 616–17 (acknowledging that some parts of the
Constitution are either ambiguous or vague), with McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 61, at 751–52
(arguing that originalist methods can discern the meaning of all constitutional provisions).
104. WHITTINGTON, supra note 68, at 1.
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popular constitutionalists believe that meaning does not exist free of
context. This divergence causes a crucial division between originalism and
popular constitutionalism.
Assuming that some original meaning is discernible, the second issue
that divides the two camps is the question of whether provisions of the
Constitution have a single fixed meaning. Originalists believe that a single
fixed meaning exists and is discernible by examining the text and the intent
of the Framers or the original public meaning of the text.105 By contrast,
popular constitutionalists accept the possibility that the text has multiple
meanings and that the meaning of the text may change through the process
of construction by the political branches. To that extent, popular
constitutionalism is premised on the existence of a living Constitution, a
concept that is antithetical to most originalists. To be sure, originalists’
criticism of living constitutionalism is aimed primarily at judges, not at
political actors.106 Nonetheless, the fixation thesis is a central tenet of
originalism, and popular constitutionalism is arguably diametrically
opposed to that thesis.
B. Politics and Law in Constitutional Interpretation
The key issue in determining whether popular originalism is an
oxymoron is whether political considerations may be allowed to affect
originalist constitutional interpretation. When political actors engage in
constitutional construction, political considerations are likely to affect their
application of the Constitution.107 Thus, determining whether popular
originalism is an oxymoron turns on whether it is possible to interpret the
Constitution in a political context and still adhere to the Constitution’s
original meaning.
Some originalists acknowledge that contemporary context is relevant to
constitutional interpretation when interpreters engage in constitutional
construction. Constitutional construction occurs when it is necessary to
determine the meaning of constitutional provisions that are vague, that is,
when it is difficult to discern their meaning.108 Though not all originalists
agree that constitutional construction is necessary,109 many recognize its
necessity when original meaning is not easily discernible from the
105. Solum, supra note 8, at 4; see also BARNETT, supra note 8, at 89.
106. One interesting exception to the general tendency of originalists to focus only on courts’
interpretation of the Constitution is the ongoing debate among originalists over whether and when
courts should defer to nonoriginalist precedent. See Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of
Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1734–39.
107. See Solum, supra note 8, at 6 n.22.
108. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 100 (“Constitutional construction fills the inevitable gaps
created by the vagueness of these words when applied to particular circumstances.”).
109. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 45, at 752 (reasoning that “the
constructionists have not supplied evidence that the constitutional enactors contemplated
construction”).
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constitutional text.110 Arguably, popular constitutionalism could provide a
process for determining the meaning of vague constitutional provisions
through the mechanism of open public debate or the legislative process of
decisionmaking.111 Originalists agree that courts could play a role in
determining constitutional meaning, although they disagree on whether
other actors could play such a role.112 To the extent that an originalist is
willing to acknowledge that actors other than courts can construe the
Constitution, he may be open to popular constitutionalism.113
To maintain fidelity to the original text, it seems that originalists would
be particularly likely to condemn the politicization of constitutional
interpretation. However, original intent originalists such as former judge
Robert Bork and former Attorney General Edwin Meese have advocated
deference to the political branches, arguably leaving space for popular
constitutionalism.114 Paradoxically then, given the original intent
originalists’ critique of the living constitutionalism of the Warren Court,
their deference to political branches left more space for political branches
to interpret the Constitution and thus politicize constitutional interpretation
outside of the courts.115 More recently, however, originalists have
downplayed the extent to which they advocate judicial restraint.116
According to Professor Keith Whittington, “The primary virtue claimed by
the new originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint
or democratic majoritarianism.”117 Contemporary originalists are therefore
more likely to be suspicious of popular constitutionalism and more likely
to reject legislative measures that are inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Constitution and its amendments.118 Put another way,
“new” originalists may believe that popular constitutionalism is invalid
unless those who engage in popular constitutionalism are themselves
originalists.
The Tea Party movement has called on lawmakers to engage in
originalist interpretations of the Constitution.119 Despite any stated
110. Solum, supra note 8, at 19; see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 63, at 631–32.
111. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 550 (arguing that the Constitution is a “framework for
governance that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time through constitutional
construction”).
112. See Strang, supra note 6, at 20.
113. Id.
114. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
352–53 (1990); Edwin Meese, III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial LawMaking, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 926–28 (1996).
115. See Strang, supra note 6, at 16–18.
116. Whittington, supra note 7, at 609.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 608–09 (pointing out that some “new” originalists advocate such judicial
activism); see also Kramer, supra note 66, at 960 (pointing out that interest in popular
constitutionalism has been fueled by the activism of the Rehnquist Court).
119. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 283.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss2/5

20

Zietlow: Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Th

2012]

POPULAR ORIGINALISM?

503

intentions, though, it is not clear that politicians could make decisions
based solely on the original meaning of the Constitution and still represent
the interests of their political constituents. Political officials are
accountable to their electorates and are therefore institutionally bound to
take political considerations into account when interpreting the
Constitution, in a way that federal courts are not. This is not to say that
courts are completely isolated from political pressures. Recent empirical
work shows that courts are responsive to political trends.120 Nonetheless, it
is undeniable that legislatures are institutionally responsive to the popular
will, while courts, by contrast, are institutionally designed to limit the
impact of the political will on their rulings.
Professor Mariah Zeisberg has suggested that constitutional fidelity is
reconcilable with popular constitutionalism if one distinguishes between
political office holders and individual citizens interpreting the
Constitution.121 Members of the political branches are arguably bound by
fidelity to the Constitution because of their institutional role as lawmakers
and their oath to uphold the Constitution.122 Citizens, Zeisberg argues,
have more flexibility to determine whether they agree with the
authoritative interpretation of the Constitution.123 Thus, Zeisberg defends
Frederick Douglass’ claim that the Constitution prohibited slavery even
though Douglass may have believed the opposite to be true.124 While it
would be possible to view Douglass as an opportunist who was not faithful
to the Constitution, Zeisberg argues that Douglass’ status as a citizen (and
not a public official) justified his position. Zeisberg points out that “[t]he
office of citizen is privileged in consent theory” because the Constitution
“owes its authority to the consent of the people.”125 Even if judges and
legislators “owe[d] deference to the public understandings of the text when
ratified,” citizens might still be justified in deferring to the “moral appeal
of the interpretive position itself.”126 The work of the public would be to
generate interpretations of the Constitution that are more just.127
If Zeisberg is correct, popular constitutionalism plays an important role
in refining and improving our understanding of the Constitution. The
120. See generally BARRY E. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009)
(describing the relationship between popular opinion and the Supreme Court); LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) (discussing the effects of the political
environment on the Warren Court).
121. See Mariah Zeisberg, Frederick Douglass, Citizen Interpreter 35–36 (Aug. 26, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583683.
122. Id. at 36.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 11–12.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id. at 37.
127. Id.
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people themselves would not be bound by originalism; instead, they would
have the latitude to interpret the Constitution consistently with their values
and morals. Nonetheless, in Zeisberg’s paradigm, elected officials could
still be bound by fidelity to the original Constitution and arguably limited
in their authority to take political considerations into account in
constitutional interpretation. Their fidelity to the Constitution might
compel them to take positions that differ from the desires of their political
constituents. Thus, elected officials must weigh their responsibilities as
democratic representatives of the people.
Professor Jack M. Balkin’s theory of “framework originalism” also
seeks to reconcile originalism with the type of evolving constitutional
meaning inherent in popular constitutionalism. Balkin acknowledges that
the Constitution contains some provisions that have a determinate
meaning, but he points out that much of the Constitution describes
standards and principles that are deliberately vague.128 According to
Balkin, the Framers of the Constitution and its amendments intended those
provisions to be vague so that the political branches could interpret them
capaciously over time.129 Thus, the Constitution is “primarily a framework
for governments, a skeleton on which much will later be built.”130 Balkin’s
originalism preserves the framework but leaves open the possibility of
constitutional constructions that implement the Constitution consistent
with its original meaning.131
What Balkin calls “living constitutionalism” is part of his theory of
framework originalism. This is because construction is necessary when the
terms of the Constitution are vague or silent on a question and “when we
need to create laws or build institutions to fulfill constitutional
purposes.”132 Thus, both originalism and popular constitutionalism play a
role in Balkin’s theory of constitutional development. Balkin may indeed
be correct that the Constitution allows ample room for constitutional
construction. However, he does not explain how politicians engaging in
that construction can adhere to original meaning, given their obligations as
representatives of their constituents.
While the politicization of constitutional interpretation inherent in
popular constitutionalism may at first seem antithetical to originalism, it
would be inaccurate to distinguish originalism from popular
constitutionalism on the grounds that one method is less political than
another. Originalism has always been more than merely a jurisprudential
movement.133 Original intent originalists criticized not just the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Balkin, supra note 9, at 553.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 560.
See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 549.
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methodology, but also the results, of the Warren Court’s “activist” rulings.
Indeed, Edwin Meese acknowledged that he intended his originalist agenda
to check the “drift back toward the radical egalitarianism and expansive
civil libertarianism of the Warren Court.”134 Since the early 1980s, the
connections between originalism and a conservative political agenda have
been widely recognized: “Thus when President Reagan praised his
appointees because they embraced a judicial ‘philosophy of
restraint,’ . . . everyone immediately understood that he was appealing to
the high ground of neutrality in order to justify the appointment of judges
who were ‘committed to a narrow ideological [conservative] agenda.’”135
The current salience of the Tea Party movement is arguably the
culmination of the political side of the originalist movement.
An elected official with ties to the Tea Party movement may well be
torn between his fidelity to the original Constitution and meeting the needs
of his constituents. Of course, it is unclear whether Tea Partiers care about
fidelity to the original Constitution or whether they simply use the
originalist mantra to attain substantive political goals. The answer to this
question may be essential to an originalist, but it might not matter at all to a
popular constitutionalist. Popular constitutionalists do not care about
motivation. What matters to them is the efficacy of the argument and the
extent to which it succeeds in changing constitutional law. Popular
constitutionalism allows ample space for the articulation of both politics
and law.136 The challenge of popular originalism is determining how much
space the Constitution allows for adherence to its original meaning while
achieving political goals.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND DEMOCRACY
The Tea Party movement builds on an originalist movement that has
been growing, both within academia and in politics, since the late 1970s.
Prominent politicians, such as Edwin Meese, have claimed to be
originalists, as have judges appointed by presidents who also professed
adherence to originalism.137 In the political realm, conservative candidates
have rallied the support of social conservatives by stridently opposing the
Court’s nonoriginalist abortion rights ruling in Roe v. Wade.138 On the
Supreme Court, Justices who profess themselves originalists have
revitalized the doctrine of sovereign immunity and limits on congressional

134. See Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986).
135. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 555–56.
136. See Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 75, at 1348.
137. For example, President Ronald Reagan appointed a prominent originalist, William
Rehnquist, as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
138. See Post & Siegel, supra note 96, at 374, 377.
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power.139 Notwithstanding Justice Stephen Breyer’s recent attempt to
revive “living constitutionalism,”140 it is difficult to imagine a “living
constitutionalist” nominee to the Court winning approval in the Senate
today. Modern originalism has been highly successful.141 Paradoxically,
Dean Robert Post and Professor Reva Siegel argue that the political
practice of originalism actually exemplifies living constitutionalism.142
However, with the notable exception of the judicial nomination process,
popular originalism has achieved its constitutional victories not through the
political process, but through the process of judicial review.143
Both modern originalism and popular constitutionalism were inspired,
at least in part, by concerns about judicial overreaching in constitutional
interpretation. Both originalists and proponents of popular
constitutionalism have decried judicial activism and championed deference
to the political process.144 Of the two, however, only popular
constitutionalism is wedded to the concept of deference to the democratic
process.145 Indeed, the relationship between constitutional interpretation
and democratic decisionmaking may mark the most significant divergence
between originalism and popular constitutionalism.
Protecting democratic rule was once one of the primary justifications
for modern originalism.146 Originalism as a modern movement began as a
critique of the “political” rulings of the liberal Warren Court.147 Early
proponents of originalism such as Robert Bork and Professor Raoul Berger
criticized the Warren Court’s willingness to invalidate legislation based on
what they viewed as the Court’s substantive political values.148 They
139. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
140. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
115–32 (2005) (arguing for constitutional interpretation that allows adaptation to unanticipated
situations).
141. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 554.
142. Id. at 569.
143. Ironically, the Court’s originalist rulings have caused at least one scholar to label the
Rehnquist Court as “The Most Activist Supreme Court in History.” See THOMAS M. KECK, THE
MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM
passim (2004); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why
It Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 287–92 (2008) (comparing the relative “activism” of the
Rehnquist and Warren Courts). The political movement in favor of gun rights also achieved
significant success through the political process before doing so through the process of judicial
review. See ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 5–6; Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 75, at 193–94.
144. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 114, at 351–55; Zietlow, supra note 143, at 255–60; Post &
Siegel, supra note 96, at 373–76.
145. See Strang, supra note 6, at 16.
146. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 552–53.
147. See id. at 545; Whittington, supra note 7, at 599.
148. BORK, supra note 114, at 69–100; Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 547 (citing RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
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presented originalism as an antidote to “judicial activism” because
originalism was a normatively neutral form of constitutional
interpretation.149 At that time, originalism was said to reduce judicial
discretion and the concomitant opportunity for judges to impose their own
political values under the guise of judicial review.150 More recently,
however, originalists have strayed from this line of reasoning and no longer
champion the political process. Indeed, few originalists today “subscribe to
a broad constitutional requirement of judicial deference.”151 Instead,
proponents of originalism call on the Court to impose limitations on the
democratic process based on an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution.152 Thus, instead of furthering democratic decisionmaking,
originalism has become a justification for judicial activism.153
In contrast, by definition, the democratic process will always play a
major role in popular constitutionalism. Popular constitutionalism is a
process of interpretation. Popular constitutionalists maintain that the
people’s involvement in constitutional interpretation lends legitimacy to
that interpretation. One of the primary goals of popular constitutionalism is
to involve the people in the constitutional dialogue. Popular
constitutionalists point out that while courts are influenced by political
developments, the influence of politics on popular constitutionalism is
considerably more transparent than judicial review.154 Unlike judicial
deliberations, the debates of lawmakers responding to popular
constitutionalism are recorded and open to the public.155 Popular
constitutionalism strengthens civic society and correspondingly strengthens
democracy.
Scholars have debated the impact of the Tea Party and its ideology on
the democratic process. Professor Jared Goldstein claims that the Tea Party
is antidemocratic because participants in the movement are taking
363–64, 386 (1977)); Whittington, supra note 7, at 601.
149. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695
(1976); Whittington, supra note 7, at 602.
150. See Meese, supra note 114, at 927–28; Meese, supra note 134, at 464–65; Rehnquist,
supra note 149, at 703–04. A number of scholars have questioned whether originalism really has
restrained judges from imposing their own views under the guise of constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 304
(1996); Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 557–68; Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the
Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 432–33 (1998).
151. See Strang, supra note 6, at 14.
152. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 8, at 189.
153. As Lee Strang has pointed out, originalism can be the basis for limiting the power of the
legislature by imposing either interior or external limits on legislative power. See Strang, supra note
6, at 17 (describing the difference between the attitudes of “conservative” and “libertarian”
originalists towards judicial deference).
154. ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 11.
155. See id. at 160–61.
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absolutist positions that discourage democratic debate.156 Goldstein points
out that Tea Partiers often dismiss opponents as being illegitimate and even
un-American.157 Tea Partiers argue that there is only one correct meaning
of the Constitution: “what our Founders and our founding documents
meant.”158 Paradoxically, then, even as they are engaging in popular
constitutionalism, the Tea Partiers reject the notion of living
constitutionalism implicit in democratic constitutional debate. Goldstein
concludes that the Tea Party “undermines the claim by some popular
constitutionalists that popular engagement with the Constitution and
control over constitutional interpretation promote democratic values and
may be necessary for democratic legitimacy.”159
Professor Ilya Somin disagrees with Goldstein, asserting that the Tea
Party movement enhances democracy and “serve[s] a useful role as a check
on the power of political elites.”160 Somin argues that the Tea Partiers’
focus on limiting the federal government serves the interest of democracy
because “[t]he enormous size . . . of modern government undercuts
meaningful democratic control over government policy.”161 Somin
dismisses Goldstein’s concerns about the Tea Party rhetoric, maintaining
that “[g]iven the quasi-sacred status of the Constitution in American
political culture, any suggestion that opponents’ major policies violate it to
some extent brands them as enemies of the nation’s fundamental
values.”162
In evaluating the feasibility of popular originalism, the experience of
the Tea Party movement is instructive. So far, their most significant
constitutional victories have occurred not through the democratic process,
but in the federal courts. The primary constitutional debate in which Tea
Partiers engaged was that over the ACA.163 Tea Party activists participated
in numerous demonstrations against the ACA during congressional
debates, claiming that it would unduly expand the federal government and

156. See Goldstein, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 291.
157. Id. at 290 (“In Tea Party rhetoric, the Constitution is a label for the fundamental
principles that the movement embraces, while all other values and politics are regarded as
dangerously un-American.”).
158. Id. at 292 (quoting Ellen, supra note 37) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Goldstein, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 291.
160. Somin, supra note 12, at 301.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 304 (footnote omitted). Somin’s response here is ironic because he seems to
advocate the same constitutional fundamentalism that characterizes the Tea Party movement.
163. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code (2010)).
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infringe on individual liberty.164 Congressional opponents of the ACA
echoed the Tea Partiers during those debates.165 They lost the debate when
Congress approved the ACA.166 Despite the fact that opposition to federal
courts as constitutional arbiters is a fundamental principle of the
constitutional theories of the Tea Party, Tea Partiers immediately filed
lawsuits opposing the Act. Invoking constitutional reasoning that mirrors
that of Tea Party activists and their supporters in Congress, three judges
have relied on originalist reasoning to rule against the Act.167 These
judicial victories are ironic since the Tea Partiers had lost their popular
constitutionalist battle over the ACA. The ACA itself was a major victory
of progressive popular constitutionalism.168 Rather than ceding to the
constitutional interpretation of the country’s elected representatives, Tea
Partiers resorted to the courts to impose their originalist values. Other
courts have upheld the ACA,169 and the U.S. Supreme Court will
ultimately resolve this constitutional dispute.170 It is still possible that the
Tea Party position, which failed in the democratic process, will prevail
through the process of judicial review.
A number of Tea Party-supported candidates were elected to Congress
in fall 2010, which significantly affected the public debate over spending
164. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 282.
165. See Zietlow, supra note 4.
166. Id.
167. See Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011
WL 4072875, at *21 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *29 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011), order clarified, 780
F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011);
Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, Nos., 11-1057, 11-1058,
2011 WL 3925617 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011).
168. See Zietlow, supra note 4.
169. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *533 (6th Cir.
June 29, 2011); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011), hearing en banc denied, No.
11-5047, 2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2011). Several other courts dismissed challenges
for lack of justiciability. See Kinder v. Geithner, No. 1:10-CV-101(RWS), 2011 WL 1576721, at
*4–10 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011) (standing and ripeness); Purpura v. Sebelius, No. 10-04814, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43153, at *34 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2011), aff’d, No. 11-2303, 2011 WL 4494187 (3d
Cir. Sept. 29, 2011) (standing); Peterson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (D.N.H. 2011)
(standing); N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d 502, 510–11 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., No. 10-4600, 2011 WL 3366340 (3d Cir. Aug. 3,
2011) (standing); Shreeve v. Obama, No. 1:10-CV-71, 2010 WL 4628177, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov.
4, 2010) (standing); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033 DMS(WMC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89192, at *13–14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010), aff’d, No. 10-56374, 2011 WL 3524287 (9th Cir. Aug.
12, 2011) (standing).
170. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-393, 2011 WL 5515164 (U.S.
Nov. 14, 2011); Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-400, 2011 WL 5515165 (U.S.
Nov. 14, 2011); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, 2011 WL 5515162 (U.S. Nov.
14, 2011).
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and taxes in 2011. Tea Partiers’ opposition to federal spending and taxes
may reflect their conservative values more than their originalist
constitutional views. To a popular constitutionalist, however, what matters
is not their motivation but the fact that the debate over the size and
function of government implicates structural constitutional issues, such as
federalism and the power of the federal government.171
The Tea Party has achieved significant political success since its
founding, but it has not yet achieved constitutional change in the political
realm. So far, the Tea Party’s constitutional victories have been confined to
court rulings.172 This lends support to the view that authentic originalism
may simply not work in the political process. Perhaps judges are better
than political actors at interpreting the Constitution consistently with
original meaning. It is possible that the insulation of judges from the
political process facilitates their implementation of originalism as a method
of constitutional interpretation. Insulation from politics may be necessary
to interpret the Constitution in a manner that is consistent with its original
meaning.
However, it would be premature to evaluate the long-term impact of
the Tea Party movement on our constitutional structure at this time. The
long-term goal of the Tea Party movement is to shrink the size and power
of the federal government and thus alter our system of federalism. Tea
Party activists argue that reducing the size of the federal government would
be consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, but like all
popular constitutionalists, they are using constitutional advocacy to achieve
their political goals. Members of the Tea Party movement may well care
more about achieving those political goals than whether the lawmakers
representing them engage in originalist constitutional construction.
In the end, the success of the Tea Party movement will depend more on
the ability of the Tea Party to engage in politics and sway the popular will
than on the movement’s adherence to originalism. Popular originalists may
well have to decide which is more important to them—popular success or
adherence to originalism.
CONCLUSION
Recent years have seen a rise of interest in legal history among
constitutional theorists. Originalists and popular constitutionalists share an
interest in legal history because studying history is helpful to understanding
constitutional development and meaning. Originalists and popular
constitutionalists may inhabit the same historical archives, but until now,
171. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 282 (arguing that the Tea Party movement is most concerned
about federal spending and the size of the federal government).
172. This is particularly ironic, given the fact that opposing the courts is one of the
fundamental tenets of the Tea Party ideology. See Schmidt, supra note 11, at 534.
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there has been little scholarly interchange between the two groups. This is
unfortunate because while the two groups may differ in the extent to which
they feel bound by the past, they agree that the past is important and useful
in determining contemporary meaning.
To a significant extent, one’s view of whether the Tea Party is a
salutary development in constitutional debate may depend on one’s view of
the positions that the Tea Party espouses.173 Nonetheless, it is undeniable
that the Tea Party movement has increased the salience of debate over
constitutional issues such as federalism and individual liberty.174 Those
who disagree with the Tea Party’s view of the Constitution would do well
to remember that the long-term impact of the movement depends on its
success in convincing lawmakers to adopt its vision. Rather than dismiss
the Tea Party, it would be better for its critics to engage in the debate that
they have initiated—the debate over popular originalism.

173. Compare Somin, supra note 12, at 301 (arguing that limiting federal power would
enhance democracy), with Goldstein, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 297 (“The Tea
Party movement’s understanding of the Constitution would eliminate large swaths of federal power,
taking away the people’s hard-won authority to determine economic policies at a national level,
which has been understood to be available for several generations.”).
174. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 287.
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